The Supreme Court has agreed to hear yet another challenge to the Affordable Care Act. I'm sure the fact the Supremes agreed to hear this case a mere three days after an election that will return the Senate to Republican control is the purest of coincidence. The fact that this time, if the justices rule against the ACA, there will be not the slightest shred of a chance that Congress will agree to tweak the legislation to conform to any judicial ruling has, I'm sure, nothing whatsoever to do with their decision to hear the case. That would indicate crass political calculation, well below the dignity of such an august body of judges.
Bastards.
In case you're interested, at issue as far as I can tell are the semantics of the word "state." A group of highly indignant folks has taken umbrage with the federal government for providing subsidies to people who cannot afford insurance, when those people live in states that have refused to set up state-run health insurance exchanges. The dispute revolves around language in the ACA that restricts federal subsidies to those participating in "an exchange established by the state." The IRS has issued regulations codifying the idea that people may receive subsidies for participating in a health insurance exchange whether that exchange is run by a state or by the federal government, which is running its own exchanges--for the admittedly nefarious purpose of providing health insurance to those whose state governors are only trying to protect them from. . . having health insurance.
One group of federal appeals judges have declared the language in the original legislation ambiguous, and have consequently ruled that the IRS made a reasonable interpretation in establishing its regulations. Another appeals court has "reluctantly" determined that the law as written does, in fact, forbid the federal government from providing subsidies. As a liberal, I want to agree with the former, but as a writer, I fear that the second court might actually be correct--or at least is not clearly wrong. And the larger point is that, while the ambiguity of the phrasing does, in fact, probably give the IRS the right to do what it did, I fear that this same ambiguity will provide the conservative majority on the Supreme Court the political cover it will need to achieve its presumed desire of destroying the Affordable Care Act. Not that the Court takes into account such crass political calculations.
What everyone should bear in mind is that this law has so far provided millions of people the ability to receive healthcare to which they previously had no access. Presumably, people are alive today--or at any rate healthier today--because of this legislation. And for all the talk of gloom and doom and apocalyptic rises in the cost of coverage, nobody seems to be suffering much as a result of the ACA. Make no mistake, this lawsuit is nothing but the latest mean-spirited attempt to gut a piece of legislation that has as its goal nothing more than to help people, largely out of spite and continued irrational hatred of the man who championed the legislation in the first place. I just hope the millions of people who lose their coverage if/when the Supreme Court and their Republican enablers have their way will remember this in the next election.
Of course, the GOP will find a way to blame Obama for that, too.
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Saturday, November 8, 2014
Monday, September 1, 2014
Feud for Thought
The venerable game show "Family Feud" has aired more or less continuously since the late Victorian era and gone through more hosts than the Ebola virus (too soon?). However, it is my sad duty to report that the show is officially out of ideas. The Solipsist has come into possession of a trove of notes from the program's writing staff, and a brief survey reveals how far the show has fallen since its glory days. Or day. Just take a look at these survey questions:
"Name a letter of the alphabet."
"Name the average age at which an amateur golfer gets a knee replacement?"
"Name a people-food that my dog just loves."
Those were actually among the more "normal" examples. Others included, "Name a number between one and five"--which, curiously, had seven answers--and "Name a place where you wouldn't expect to find scissors" (answers included, "A blender," "A bowl of lime sherbet," and "Galveston").
"Name a pre-Raphaelite painter."
"Name an article of clothing you wouldn't find cute if it were worn by a turtle."
"Name a flavor of mint chocolate chip ice cream."
"Name a means of poisoning someone that is undetectable when served in an omelet."
This last question drew the attention of the local authorities, and the writing staff has been temporarily suspended while the investigation continues.
"Name a letter of the alphabet."
"Name the average age at which an amateur golfer gets a knee replacement?"
"Name a people-food that my dog just loves."
Those were actually among the more "normal" examples. Others included, "Name a number between one and five"--which, curiously, had seven answers--and "Name a place where you wouldn't expect to find scissors" (answers included, "A blender," "A bowl of lime sherbet," and "Galveston").
"Name a pre-Raphaelite painter."
"Name an article of clothing you wouldn't find cute if it were worn by a turtle."
"Name a flavor of mint chocolate chip ice cream."
"Name a means of poisoning someone that is undetectable when served in an omelet."
This last question drew the attention of the local authorities, and the writing staff has been temporarily suspended while the investigation continues.
Friday, June 27, 2014
Supreme Court Round-Up
OK, OK. . . Elena Kagan's been on my ass for the last three hours, desperate to hear the Solipsist's take on the latest round of Supreme Court rulings. OK, Associate Justice Kagan, here we go.
First, the case the Court got unambiguously right: Riley v. California. In this and an associated case, United States v. Wurie, the Court held that law enforcement authorities needed to obtain a warrant before searching through someone's cell phone. Police often looked through cell phones after arresting someone, searching for evidence of criminal activity--which, given today's smartphone technology, could include not only call histories but also photographs, internet searches, journal entries--even, dare we say it, blog posts. Chief Justice John Roberts explained that the pervasiveness of cell phones (and, by extension, in all likelihood, tablets, personal computers, etc.) made them subject to the same protections against "general warrants" enshrined in the Constitution. In other words, police may no more freely rummage through one's personal data contained on an iPhone than they could barge into one's bedroom and rifle through the underwear drawer, unless they first obtain a warrant.
More interesting than the verdict, however, was the acknowledgment by the Court that changing technological standards merited changing interpretations of constitutional actions. Law enforcement officials, for example, equated searching a cellphone with other, more permissible searches of things like wallets or purses. "That," wrote Chief Justice Roberts, "is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon." In other words, as technology changes we must revisit the actions of the Founding Fathers, who codified civic norms in a time vastly different from our own. Just as a cell phone is vastly different from a wallet or an appointment book--and so calls for a different understanding of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches--so, too, is an AK-47 vastly different from a flintlock--and calls for a similar reassessment of the right to keep and bear arms.
Two other unanimous decisions were also decided correctly. I say this begrudgingly, as I am totally sympathetic to the "losing" side in both cases. First, in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Court basically said that President Obama had no right to make recess appointments to Executive Branch positions while the US Senate was "in session"--even though these "sessions" were merely pro forma meetings where no business was conducted--and, indeed, whose only purpose was to ensure that President Obama could not make recess appointments. While I abhor the obstructionist tactics of Congressional Republicans, I recognize that a certain amount of political gamesmanship is a fact of American life. And while I generally support President Obama--at least as far as his political appointments go--I am not keen to see any congressional tactic hurriedly eliminated, lest it be useful in the future when, say, someone like Ted Cruz occupies the Oval Office.
I think I just threw up in my mouth a little.
(And lest you accuse me of hypocrisy, I had similar qualms when the Democratic Senate leadership effectively eliminated the use of filibusters last year.)
The other correct if unsatisfying decision concerned the ability of legislatures to establish "buffer zones" around abortion clinics. The aim is laudable: to protect women who seek abortions (or, indeed, any services from clinics such as those run by Planned Parenthood) from harassment by pro-life protesters, legislators have declared that protesters must maintain certain minimum distances from entrances to such facilities. In its decision in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts law, which created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics. The law, the justices found, infringed on First Amendment rights to free speech. And while I sympathize with the desire of women not to be accosted by right-wing zealots as they seek to exercise their right to control their own bodies, I think that placing arbitrary (35 feet? Why not 30? Why not 40? Why not 6.5?) restrictions on speech is not the solution. As the Court pointed out, existing laws that prevent harassment and other antisocial behavior can effectively serve the same purpose as the disputed law.
Finally, the case that I just don't understand: ABC v. Aereo. The Court declared that what Aereo was doing was bad and wrong and must be stopped. Now, I had never heard of Aereo before yesterday. Apparently, it's a service that allows people to "pick up" the broadcast signals of the major television networks through a series of antennas. The networks were upset that Aereo was allowing people to do this. But unless I'm mistaken, this is how television always used to work! You turned on the TV, you fiddled with your antennas as needed, and you were able to watch "The Incredible Hulk" at grandma's house. When did this become illegal?
Anyway, Justice Kagan, there you have it. On the whole, you guys did a good--if somewhat unsatisfying--job. Now, if you'll excuse me, "Judge Judy" is on, and I need to fiddle with the ol' rabbit ears. . . .
First, the case the Court got unambiguously right: Riley v. California. In this and an associated case, United States v. Wurie, the Court held that law enforcement authorities needed to obtain a warrant before searching through someone's cell phone. Police often looked through cell phones after arresting someone, searching for evidence of criminal activity--which, given today's smartphone technology, could include not only call histories but also photographs, internet searches, journal entries--even, dare we say it, blog posts. Chief Justice John Roberts explained that the pervasiveness of cell phones (and, by extension, in all likelihood, tablets, personal computers, etc.) made them subject to the same protections against "general warrants" enshrined in the Constitution. In other words, police may no more freely rummage through one's personal data contained on an iPhone than they could barge into one's bedroom and rifle through the underwear drawer, unless they first obtain a warrant.
More interesting than the verdict, however, was the acknowledgment by the Court that changing technological standards merited changing interpretations of constitutional actions. Law enforcement officials, for example, equated searching a cellphone with other, more permissible searches of things like wallets or purses. "That," wrote Chief Justice Roberts, "is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon." In other words, as technology changes we must revisit the actions of the Founding Fathers, who codified civic norms in a time vastly different from our own. Just as a cell phone is vastly different from a wallet or an appointment book--and so calls for a different understanding of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches--so, too, is an AK-47 vastly different from a flintlock--and calls for a similar reassessment of the right to keep and bear arms.
Two other unanimous decisions were also decided correctly. I say this begrudgingly, as I am totally sympathetic to the "losing" side in both cases. First, in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Court basically said that President Obama had no right to make recess appointments to Executive Branch positions while the US Senate was "in session"--even though these "sessions" were merely pro forma meetings where no business was conducted--and, indeed, whose only purpose was to ensure that President Obama could not make recess appointments. While I abhor the obstructionist tactics of Congressional Republicans, I recognize that a certain amount of political gamesmanship is a fact of American life. And while I generally support President Obama--at least as far as his political appointments go--I am not keen to see any congressional tactic hurriedly eliminated, lest it be useful in the future when, say, someone like Ted Cruz occupies the Oval Office.
I think I just threw up in my mouth a little.
(And lest you accuse me of hypocrisy, I had similar qualms when the Democratic Senate leadership effectively eliminated the use of filibusters last year.)
The other correct if unsatisfying decision concerned the ability of legislatures to establish "buffer zones" around abortion clinics. The aim is laudable: to protect women who seek abortions (or, indeed, any services from clinics such as those run by Planned Parenthood) from harassment by pro-life protesters, legislators have declared that protesters must maintain certain minimum distances from entrances to such facilities. In its decision in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts law, which created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics. The law, the justices found, infringed on First Amendment rights to free speech. And while I sympathize with the desire of women not to be accosted by right-wing zealots as they seek to exercise their right to control their own bodies, I think that placing arbitrary (35 feet? Why not 30? Why not 40? Why not 6.5?) restrictions on speech is not the solution. As the Court pointed out, existing laws that prevent harassment and other antisocial behavior can effectively serve the same purpose as the disputed law.
Finally, the case that I just don't understand: ABC v. Aereo. The Court declared that what Aereo was doing was bad and wrong and must be stopped. Now, I had never heard of Aereo before yesterday. Apparently, it's a service that allows people to "pick up" the broadcast signals of the major television networks through a series of antennas. The networks were upset that Aereo was allowing people to do this. But unless I'm mistaken, this is how television always used to work! You turned on the TV, you fiddled with your antennas as needed, and you were able to watch "The Incredible Hulk" at grandma's house. When did this become illegal?
Anyway, Justice Kagan, there you have it. On the whole, you guys did a good--if somewhat unsatisfying--job. Now, if you'll excuse me, "Judge Judy" is on, and I need to fiddle with the ol' rabbit ears. . . .
Saturday, June 21, 2014
Absolutely!
"Daniel Stein, president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, which favors reducing immigration, said many Americans still strongly oppose legalization for the 11 million immigrants in the country illegally because they feel that life in the United States 'is a precious asset that should be not be handed out easily.'” (New York Times, Saturday, June 21)
I could not agree more with Mr. Stein. I think it completely unfair that these migrants should be allowed to achieve American citizenship without going through the hard work of people like me who had to be born here to get it!
I could not agree more with Mr. Stein. I think it completely unfair that these migrants should be allowed to achieve American citizenship without going through the hard work of people like me who had to be born here to get it!
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
While We're at It, Let's Do Away with Spring Break, Too
Wow, it's been awhile. My apologies to my loyal readers out there--all both of them--but things have been busy at Solipsist Central. Nevertheless, I felt compelled to throw in my two cents on yesterday's major court ruling in California.
In case you missed it, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rolf M. Treu declared the state's law granting public school teachers tenure after eighteen months of service unconstitutional, based on the idea that tenure protections deprive students--in particular lower-income and minority students--of the state-guaranteed right to a quality education:
“'All sides to this litigation agree that competent teachers are a critical, if not the most important, component of success of a child’s in-school educational experience,' Judge Treu wrote in his ruling. 'There is also no dispute that there are a significant number of grossly ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms.'”
I, too, basically agree with that entire statement (although words and phrases like "significant number" and "ineffective" are so vague as to be meaningless). Still, however, I reject the conclusion that, somehow, eliminating tenure protections will lead to a vast improvement in overall educational quality.
When the general public hears the word "tenure," they probably picture college professors: tweed-bedecked academics sipping brandy and pontificating on intellectual ephemera with little concern for or interest in the real world needs of the students they teach. Those who brought this particular case see tenure as little more than a job-protection program for incompetent teachers. And I will acknowledge that tenure laws do make it difficult to get rid of unsatisfactory teachers. But people need to remember that the original idea behind tenure was not to protect the incompetent from some deserved termination, but rather to protect highly-qualified professionals from arbitrary punishment when they expressed unpopular ideas. Is this, in fact, still a problem? Consider that there are school boards in Kansas that discourage the teaching of evolution. If you were a Kansas science teacher, would you be willing to discuss Darwin in a classroom--even as an alternative to creationist nonsense--unless you had some kind of tenure?
More to the point, though, What, exactly, do opponents of tenure expect will happen if they achieve their goals. Let's say we could all agree on some objective definition of "incompetence," and that schools subsequently rid themselves of all their tenured-but-incompetent instructors. What then? Do you suppose there will be some sudden influx of brilliant, dedicated instructors rushing to fill these classes? Do you think there is a vast pool of people dying to teach--if only this already poorly compensated profession would do away with one of the few perqs it offers? Or would the remaining instructors--by definition those who are competent-to-excellent--simply be asked to do even more, take on more classes, teach more students--knowing that if they are unable to keep up with the ever-increasing demands, they, too, will be found incompetent and summarily replaced?
Sure, it should be easier to get rid of grossly incompetent teachers. But in an underfunded, undervalued, overcrowded, and overburdened school system, teacher tenure is one of the least important "problems" to be tackling.
In case you missed it, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rolf M. Treu declared the state's law granting public school teachers tenure after eighteen months of service unconstitutional, based on the idea that tenure protections deprive students--in particular lower-income and minority students--of the state-guaranteed right to a quality education:
“'All sides to this litigation agree that competent teachers are a critical, if not the most important, component of success of a child’s in-school educational experience,' Judge Treu wrote in his ruling. 'There is also no dispute that there are a significant number of grossly ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms.'”
I, too, basically agree with that entire statement (although words and phrases like "significant number" and "ineffective" are so vague as to be meaningless). Still, however, I reject the conclusion that, somehow, eliminating tenure protections will lead to a vast improvement in overall educational quality.
When the general public hears the word "tenure," they probably picture college professors: tweed-bedecked academics sipping brandy and pontificating on intellectual ephemera with little concern for or interest in the real world needs of the students they teach. Those who brought this particular case see tenure as little more than a job-protection program for incompetent teachers. And I will acknowledge that tenure laws do make it difficult to get rid of unsatisfactory teachers. But people need to remember that the original idea behind tenure was not to protect the incompetent from some deserved termination, but rather to protect highly-qualified professionals from arbitrary punishment when they expressed unpopular ideas. Is this, in fact, still a problem? Consider that there are school boards in Kansas that discourage the teaching of evolution. If you were a Kansas science teacher, would you be willing to discuss Darwin in a classroom--even as an alternative to creationist nonsense--unless you had some kind of tenure?
More to the point, though, What, exactly, do opponents of tenure expect will happen if they achieve their goals. Let's say we could all agree on some objective definition of "incompetence," and that schools subsequently rid themselves of all their tenured-but-incompetent instructors. What then? Do you suppose there will be some sudden influx of brilliant, dedicated instructors rushing to fill these classes? Do you think there is a vast pool of people dying to teach--if only this already poorly compensated profession would do away with one of the few perqs it offers? Or would the remaining instructors--by definition those who are competent-to-excellent--simply be asked to do even more, take on more classes, teach more students--knowing that if they are unable to keep up with the ever-increasing demands, they, too, will be found incompetent and summarily replaced?
Sure, it should be easier to get rid of grossly incompetent teachers. But in an underfunded, undervalued, overcrowded, and overburdened school system, teacher tenure is one of the least important "problems" to be tackling.
Sunday, April 20, 2014
Who IS Gertrude Stein, Anyway?
Gertrude Stein once remarked that "to write is to live is to be."
Or not. Actually, Gertrude Stein never said any such thing. Or perhaps she did. When I say Gertrude Stein never said any such thing I really mean that I myself have no evidence that Gertrude Stein ever said any such thing. She certainly could have said such a thing. I know only a small fraction of the things Gertrude Stein ever said--a very small fraction: I've never actually read anything by Gertrude Stein; the extent of my knowledge of her writings extends scarcely further than "A rose is a rose is a rose." Which, when you think about it, makes only slightly more sense than my hypothetical remark above.
Gertrude Stein also wrote The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, and for all I know that book might contain a sentence espousing the equivalence of writing and living and being. I doubt it, but it's certainly possible. After all, Gertrude Stein presumably possessed a vocabulary that included all the words in my "quote," along with the linguistic ability to arrange those words in that same syntactical order. Maybe I'm wrong about her vocabulary. She does not seem to have known, for example, what the word "autobiography" means.
The question, then, is this: If Gertrude Stein did, in fact, write a sentence that I assumed she did not write--that I presented merely as a way to add (fraudulent) gravitas to this post--then would what I did nevertheless be considered quotation? And had I made the statement without stating that Gertrude Stein made the statement that I assumed she had not made, would my statement then be exhibit A in a case of plagiarism that would no doubt have amused Gertrude Stein immensely. If she were into that sort of thing. I don't know. As I say, I've never read anything by Gertrude Stein. I have no idea what would have amused her.
Or not. Actually, Gertrude Stein never said any such thing. Or perhaps she did. When I say Gertrude Stein never said any such thing I really mean that I myself have no evidence that Gertrude Stein ever said any such thing. She certainly could have said such a thing. I know only a small fraction of the things Gertrude Stein ever said--a very small fraction: I've never actually read anything by Gertrude Stein; the extent of my knowledge of her writings extends scarcely further than "A rose is a rose is a rose." Which, when you think about it, makes only slightly more sense than my hypothetical remark above.
Gertrude Stein also wrote The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, and for all I know that book might contain a sentence espousing the equivalence of writing and living and being. I doubt it, but it's certainly possible. After all, Gertrude Stein presumably possessed a vocabulary that included all the words in my "quote," along with the linguistic ability to arrange those words in that same syntactical order. Maybe I'm wrong about her vocabulary. She does not seem to have known, for example, what the word "autobiography" means.
The question, then, is this: If Gertrude Stein did, in fact, write a sentence that I assumed she did not write--that I presented merely as a way to add (fraudulent) gravitas to this post--then would what I did nevertheless be considered quotation? And had I made the statement without stating that Gertrude Stein made the statement that I assumed she had not made, would my statement then be exhibit A in a case of plagiarism that would no doubt have amused Gertrude Stein immensely. If she were into that sort of thing. I don't know. As I say, I've never read anything by Gertrude Stein. I have no idea what would have amused her.
Tuesday, April 8, 2014
It's All about the Fundamentals
Tonight, the final game of the 2014 NCAA Women's Basketball Championship features an unprecedented matchup: The two teams, the University of Connecticut Lady Huskies and the Notre Dame Fighting Irish. . .Women. . . . The Harridans? I don't know. Where was I?
Oh, yeah. The two teams both come into the final game undefeated! They boast a combined record of something like 1,645-0. This has never happened in the history of college basketball--men's or women's. Incredibly impressive. . . . And yet.
How seriously can one take a sport where the head coach of one of the teams in the championship game is named Muffet McGraw?
Seriously.
Oh, yeah. The two teams both come into the final game undefeated! They boast a combined record of something like 1,645-0. This has never happened in the history of college basketball--men's or women's. Incredibly impressive. . . . And yet.
How seriously can one take a sport where the head coach of one of the teams in the championship game is named Muffet McGraw?
Seriously.
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